GrapheneOS On Pixel Devices Will Continue
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If you are in such a position, it's only a matter of time for a friendly police officer to stop being friendly as soon as he sees any signs of your phone using encryption, or GrapheneOS, or being Pixel. You will get detained/interrogated/beaten/etc. and you will share all your secrets yourself. If they have those industrial devices and you allow them to take your property from you - an OS will most likely not help you.
Instead of trusting OS to protect your data on your device from unauthorized users owning unknown toolset, it's better to make sure you have no data they might want from you, on your device.
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If you are in such a position, it's only a matter of time for a friendly police officer to stop being friendly as soon as he sees any signs of your phone using encryption, or GrapheneOS, or being Pixel. You will get detained/interrogated/beaten/etc. and you will share all your secrets yourself. If they have those industrial devices and you allow them to take your property from you - an OS will most likely not help you.
Instead of trusting OS to protect your data on your device from unauthorized users owning unknown toolset, it's better to make sure you have no data they might want from you, on your device.
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So it's an OS for journalists now? For protesters? I'm not going to trust an OS that failed to save anyone from Meta, to save me from my government.
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So it's an OS for journalists now? For protesters? I'm not going to trust an OS that failed to save anyone from Meta, to save me from my government.
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My issue is that someone who say they do everything they can to harden your device and improve security, fail at simple things. Like blocking such traffic at the OS level for all untrusted apps, or allowing installing untrusted apps at all. It's like they can't decide who their product is for. And users thinking they are getting more protected just because they switched to another OS, as a result.
Making security measures irrelevant is easy for police officers, for app makers, and for users too.
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My issue is that someone who say they do everything they can to harden your device and improve security, fail at simple things. Like blocking such traffic at the OS level for all untrusted apps, or allowing installing untrusted apps at all. It's like they can't decide who their product is for. And users thinking they are getting more protected just because they switched to another OS, as a result.
Making security measures irrelevant is easy for police officers, for app makers, and for users too.
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I'm not implying there are better ones. I mean that ways how "better" systems are being built, updated by developers, and how are they viewed by users, should make everyone question whether those are actually useful.
GOS lets you decide what apps to trust
But not what vendors to trust...
GOS is EXTREMELY clear about who their product is for
Clear... but apparently not loud enough because all I know is "for Google Pixel owners".
It's not like I even want to use GOS. I want to use something that cares about me as a user, more than the default experience with limited and forced aspects. It just happens that most people say Pixel is the best phone overall for now, and I can't ignore that.
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I'm not implying there are better ones. I mean that ways how "better" systems are being built, updated by developers, and how are they viewed by users, should make everyone question whether those are actually useful.
GOS lets you decide what apps to trust
But not what vendors to trust...
GOS is EXTREMELY clear about who their product is for
Clear... but apparently not loud enough because all I know is "for Google Pixel owners".
It's not like I even want to use GOS. I want to use something that cares about me as a user, more than the default experience with limited and forced aspects. It just happens that most people say Pixel is the best phone overall for now, and I can't ignore that.
